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ABSTRACT: Practical arguments for actions are arguments which, besides their epistemic function,
shall motivate an addressee to execute the justified action. First, a strategy is developed how this
motivational and other requirements can be met. Part of this strategy is to identify a thesis for which
holds that believing it motivates in the required manner. Second, relying on empirical decision
theory, such a thesis is identified. Finally, precise validity criteria for the respective arguments are
developed.
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between judgement and action, justificatory thesis, justifying actions, motivation requirement,
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE AIM OF THIS PAPER
The main aim of this paper is to develop a conception of good practical arguments
for prudential justifications of actions – where ‘prudential’ here is understood as,
different from and sometimes in opposition to ‘moral’, regarding the best interest of
a given person. And the terms ‘practical argument’ or ‘practical justification’ can be
defined provisionally as: argument or justification sustaining a proposal to execute
or realise the justified object, i.e. the action. The theoretical approach chosen here to
develop this conception is the epistemological approach to argumentation, which
holds that the standard function of argumentation is to bring about an addressee's
justified belief (i.e. cognition or knowledge in a weak sense) in the argument's thesis
by guiding his cognising the thesis.1 In addition, the method chosen is not to
immediately systematise everyday argumentation but to take a rather theoretical
route in asking first what a practical argument shall achieve.
2. THE PROBLEM OF PRACTICAL JUSTIFICATIONS AND A STRATEGY TO
OVERCOME IT – THE PRACTICAL JUSTIFICATORY THESIS

The epistemological approach to argumentation is advanced e.g. by John Biro, Richard Feldman,
James Freeman, Alvin Goldman, Christoph Lumer, Harvey Siegel, Mark Weinstein. For an overview
see: Lumer, 2005b.
1

Mohammed, D., & Lewiński, M. (Eds.). Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013. Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1-16.
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So, the aim of this contribution is to develop a conception of practical justifications
of objects like actions, rules, norms, instruments; and the approach on the basis of
which this is done is the epistemological approach to argumentation. However, it is
precisely the epistemological approach which seems to lead to considerable
problems with respect to practical arguments. First, if according to the
epistemological approach to argumentation the standard aim of argumentation is to
bring about justified belief and if, as is usually held and is also held by the
epistemological approach, a belief's content is a proposition so that the claim of an
argument is again a proposition, or more precisely: the judgment that a certain
proposition is true, then actions can be neither the direct object or the claim of an
argument nor the direct standard output of argumentation. The claim can only be a
judgment about a proposition, and the direct standard output can only be a
(hopefully justified) belief. The second problem of an epistemological approach to
practical arguments is that leading to a new justified belief is characteristic of
theoretical arguments but it is not sufficient for a good practical argument or a
practical justification. Good and successful practical arguments are also motivating:
if the addressee of the practical argument is identical to the subject of the action to
be justified, then this addressee, after having accepted the argument cognitively, is
also motivated to execute this action.
The problem just sketched is further broadened by the fact that beyond
actions there are still other objects of practical justifications which are not
judgments either. Among the things we can practically justify are instruments,
definitions, motions, morals, norms, conceptions of rationality or of science,
empirical theories etc. Even for these objects it holds that the practical justification
should not only lead to new cognitions about them but also to a practical kind of
acceptance of them, i.e. to a certain kind of motivation with respect to these objects.
The easiest and clearest way to put the theoretical, epistemic and the
practical, motivational aspects together and to fulfil both kinds of requirements is to
reduce practical arguments to special kinds of epistemic (“theoretical”) arguments:2
A practical justification of or a practical argument for some x (where x is not a
judgment or a belief) is an epistemic argument for a certain thesis about x, which is
called the ‘justificatory thesis’; this justificatory thesis then has to satisfy certain
conditions, in particular, believing in this thesis (under certain conditions) must
lead to the required motivation with respect to x. This strategy for conceptualising
practical justifications and arguments neatly separates questions of truth and
questions of relevance. Epistemic and alethic requirements of truth are fulfilled if
the practical argument is a valid, sound and situationally adequate argument for a
certain thesis; the standards for this component can be developed analogously to
those for other epistemic types of arguments. Requirements of relevance and
motivation instead are fulfilled by the fact that the argument justifies a very specific
thesis, namely the justificatory thesis.

The strategy and the adequacy conditions set out the following have been elaborated in more detail
in: Lumer, 2009, pp. 241-350. An abbreviated exposition of the conception of practical justification is:
Lumer, 2010, pp. 151-154.
2
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3. ADEQUACY CONDITIONS FOR THE JUSTIFICATORY THESIS
The first principal task in executing the just sketched strategy is to determine the
justificatory thesis. This is a difficult and decisive part of the research, and has to be
developed with much care. In order to blurt out an ad hoc proposal it is helpful to
proceed in a somewhat indirect way: First, I will postulate and motivate some
adequacy conditions for such a justificatory thesis; in the second step, I will work
out a justificatory thesis which fulfils these adequacy conditions.
AC1

Adequacy Condition 1: reference to the object: A minimal requirement
of relevance for a justificatory thesis is that it is a thesis about the
object of justification.

Otherwise, we could not say that the argument for this thesis is also a justification of
the object in question. Hence in the following we have to search only for the
justificatory predicate (in the logical sense of: a radical of a proposition) of the
justificatory thesis. The justificatory predicate also represents a criterion of quality
for the object of justification.
AC2

Adequacy Condition 2: motivation: Justificatory theses are motivating
in the sense that if a prudent addressee (i.e. an epistemically and
practically rational addressee with certain relevant information) is
convinced of the justificatory thesis he is motivated, at least to a
certain degree, to perform the above (section 2) mentioned action
with respect to the object of justification. For other objects the
motivation requirement is weaker. In case e.g. of a moral norm the
addressee must have only an initial motivation to follow the norm,
which, however, can be overruled by stronger opposite motives.

Some reasons for the motivation requirement are: 1. The motivation
requirement is the specifically practical component of the conception of practical
justification. Practical justifications must go beyond mere epistemic justifications by
having a certain influence on this practice; they must lead to a practical acceptance
of the object of justification. A practical justification would have failed if it had no
further influence, if e.g. the addressee were to ask: ‘Okay, now I know that the thesis
about this object of justification is true; but so what? Why should this be relevant or
important?’. ‘Practical acceptance’ of the object of justification can only be
explicated in terms of motivation for certain actions. 2. Fulfilling the motivation
requirement ensures the relevance of the insight. After all, we can have an infinite
number of insights about any object of a justification. The large majority of them
would be so arbitrary and irrelevant that we would not even know why the fact
stated in them should be a reason for the object of justification. Relevance is
constituted, however by establishing some relation to our motives. 3. Pragmatically,
a practical justification fulfilling the motivation requirement has the advantage of
really bringing about something. The pure pragmatist does not need to claim that
other types of practical justifications which do not fulfil this condition are false, or
3
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invalid or something like that; he can simply leave such “justifications” to
themselves and bet on their lack of influence. – Fulfilling the motivation
requirement presupposes a strong theory of action, which informs us about how
which kind of convictions can affect our motivation.
AC3

Adequacy Condition 3: stability of the motivation effect against new
information: The motivational effect of a justified conviction of the
justificatory thesis is not infringed upon by acquiring new true
information. This means, there is no true information for which holds:
if the respective person had this information she would continue to
believe in the justificatory thesis, but this belief would no longer
motivate in the way required by AC2.

The point of this adequacy condition is not the stability (against new information) of
the belief in the justificatory thesis itself but the stability of its motivational effect.
Since a good and valid practical justification may be only defeasible, sometimes it
will happen that some new and true information makes the addressee revise his
belief in the justificatory thesis; this is no wonder and no objection to taking the
thesis' predicate as the justificatory predicate. What may not happen though,
according to stability condition AC3, is that the new information leaves the
conviction of the justificatory thesis intact but erases its motivational effect because
the addressee has changed his decision criterion because of that new information.
Some reasons in favour of the condition of motivational stability are these: 1.
Stability against new information is the rational component of the conception of
practical justification. The requirement of stability against new information
introduces the practically relevant maximum of epistemic rationality into the
conception of practical justification, namely that when practically accepting the
object of justification all true and relevant convictions have been taken into account.
2. Stability with respect to new information prevents the practical justifications
from being persuasive in a pejorative sense. It introduces some sort of wisdom,
wisdom in the sense of transcending singular knowledge towards a more
comprehensive knowledge about nexuses and the fundamental questions of life. 3.
Stability with respect to new information contributes to the long-term duration of
the motivational effect.
For reasons of space I leave out the adequacy conditions for justifying other
objects than actions.
To further develop the theory of practical justifications of actions, we now
need a strong philosophy of action, or more precisely, a strong cognitive psychology
of decisions, which can tell us by which kind of convictions people can be stably
motivated to act in a certain way
4. SOME ESSENTIALS OF COGNITIVE DECISION PSYCHOLOGY 3
Parts of the following decision psychology have been elaborated in full in different publications:
Most of the psychological laws and the parts on intrinsic valuations in: Lumer, 2009, pp. 128-240;
428-521; the theory of intention and the theory of deciding to decide in: Lumer, 2005a; and some
3
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A general view in decision psychology, accepted by the overwhelming majority of
psychologists and economists doing empirical research in this field and a common
feature of most empirical decision theories, is that deliberations roughly follow a
decision theoretic framework: If people deliberate to form an intention they search
for possible options; they consider the advantages and disadvantages of these
options, i.e. they look for their possible non-neutral consequences (or more
generally: the implications), the probability and desirability of these consequences;
they value the options in the light of these advantages and disadvantages and,
finally, choose the option with the highest value (overviews: Camerer, 1995, pp.
617-674; Slovic et al., 1988). This means that the kind of information deciders seek
during deliberation and the way they integrate them aims at providing an answer to
the question ‘which is the best action?’. Although usually they do not internally
formulate an optimality judgment, what they have tried to find out and what the
cognitive result of their deliberation is and in the moment of decision believed to be
true is an optimality judgment: ‘A certain action a is optimum among the options
considered’, where the action distinguished in this way is now intended.
H1

Intentions as optimality beliefs: Intentions are optimality beliefs that a
certain action (on the basis of the subject's present data) is optimum
(in a sense to be specified) among the options considered.

Hypothesis H1 is not intended to mean that when people have these optimality
beliefs that they think they have found the really best action but only that on the
basis of their present information a is the best action. Hence, the optimality belief
hypothesis (H1) does not imply that subjects believe that by continuing their
deliberation or by obtaining new information they could not find a better option or
could not find out that another of the considered options really is the best action.
No, the optimality belief is only relative to the decider's present information.
‘Optimum’ is the same as: highest desirability. So what does ‘desirability’
mean? The desirability referred to in H1 is the personal desirability, more precisely
the personal desirability of the respective subject. A more technical version of this
notion is also relative to a data base, e.g. the subject’s own data base at the moment
of decision. So, the correct notion is: ‘the personal desirability of object a for subject
s on the data base d’, which refers to or stands for a quantity. Since the following
deals with personal desirability only, not e.g. with moral or social desirability, the
addition ‘personal’ will sometimes be omitted. There are several concepts of
personal desirability; the concept meant in H1 is ‘personal prospect desirability’.
Prospect desirability is a summarising or aggregating desirability, which under
conditions of incomplete information integrates all known desirability aspects of the
value object into one quantity. These other desirability aspects are (i) the personal
intrinsic desirability of the value object itself, i.e. the desirability it has as such – if it
has any – independent of its consequences or other implications, and (ii) the
personal intrinsic or personal prospect desirabilities of its various (and relevant)
major parts of it have been summarised in: Lumer, 2007.

5
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possible consequences or implications.
During deliberation about executive actions subjects use decision strategies
implying many secondary criteria of the aggregating desirability and optimality of
alternatives. But there seems to be one primary, i.e. fundamental and most exact,
criterion of the desirability and optimality of alternatives with which the quality of
the secondary criteria can be measured.
This is what hypothesis H2 says:
H2

Primary and secondary desirability: Humans use a wide variety of
decision modes implying different criteria of the aggregative
desirability and optimality of options. These modes are not inborn but
developed through cognitive processes, and their use in different
situations is evaluated and chosen according to reflexively optimising
deliberations that presuppose a primary or fundamental criterion of
aggregative desirability and optimality.

Even primary desirability criteria are not anthropologically fixed. There
seem to be only anthropologically fixed adequacy criteria by which people can
comparatively assess different desirability criteria as being more or less apt. This is
said in my hypothesis H3:
H3

Adequacy conditions for primary aggregative desirability concepts: If
humans choose between fundamental concepts (D1, D2, ..., Dn) of
aggregative desirability and they believe that among them D1 comes
closest to fulfilling the following adequacy conditions whereas the
others do not, they adopt D1 for their fundamental decisions. (The
conditions for decisions under certainty are left out here.)
Condition for ‘prospect desirability’ for decisions without certainty: An
adequate desirability criterion D1 is materially equivalent (i.e. on the
basis of the same information it leads to the same preferences) to that
desirability criterion Dx for which holds: if one disregards decision
costs, the constant use of Dx as the criterion for decisions without
certainty is totally optimum (i.e. optimum according to the criterion of
‘total desirability’). (Cf. Lumer, 2005a, 252.)

This means the long-term use of an adequate concept of prospect desirability
in decisions under risk leads to maximising one’s total desirability.
With respect to intrinsic desirability criteria here only a hint can be given:4
Only one of the various desirability criteria used fulfils the adequacy conditions.
This is a special form of hedonistic desirability criterion, namely a corrected form of
hedonism, which in case of a manipulative origin of positive feelings discounts their
value according to the degree of manipulation.
For a more extensive elaboration, on which the following sketch relies see: Lumer, 2009, pp. 191218; 428-521; on feeling induced intrinsic desires see also: Lumer, 2012.
4
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5. THE PRACTICAL JUSTIFICATORY THESIS
After having collected the necessary empirical information we are now able to
determine the justificatory thesis for actions. The first empirical hypothesis (H1),
that intentions are optimality beliefs, leaves no choice if we want to fulfil the first
two adequacy conditions.
JTA

Justificatory thesis for actions: The justificatory thesis for prudential
justifications of an action a of a subject s is: ‘a is the best option for s’.
More precisely, there are two levels of prudential justifications of
actions with slightly different justificatory theses.
1. Internal justification: ‘On the data base d (and with a relevance
threshold r), action a among the considered set of options has the
highest prospect (or total) desirability for subject s’, where d is the
subject's data base at the moment of choice, and the threshold value r
is appropriate to the choice situation, i.e. fitting to the desirability of
the considered options and reasonable with respect to deliberation
costs.
2. External justification: ‘On the data base d (and with a relevance
threshold r), action a among all available options has the highest
prospect (or total) desirability for s’, where d is the data base of an
external instance, e.g. another subject, an expert or the set of all
truths, and the threshold value r is fitting to the desirability of the
considered options.

The threshold value r has been introduced here as a further variable in the
justificatory theses in the light of the possibility and practical importance of
differently precise valuations (see the discussion of H2). That ‘the relevance
threshold is r’ means that all the consequences or implications of the value object(s)
which have a higher (absolute) prospect desirability than r (and which are
cognisable on the data base d) are included in the calculation of the prospect
desirability of the value object a. Lowering the relevance threshold means to aspire
to more precise valuations. Increasing the relevance threshold may be adequate e.g.
when a decision has to be taken urgently.
The difference between an internal and an external justification reflects the
difference between perspectives when an agent has to decide in a given situation
with the cognitive means at hand or when an external entity – which also can be the
agent herself in a second moment – considers which action is the really best, i.e. best
if the agent's cognitive limitations are eliminated. Actually there are many external
perspectives covering a range between full information and the data base of a
specific person different from s. The external entity should consider all available
(and relevant) options, whereas the subject can compare only those options which
she has considered. However, one of the options of a rational subject is always to
continue deliberation, thereby increasing the preciseness of her valuations or also,
possibly, searching for new options and thus expanding the set of considered
options.
7
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The justificatory theses speak of ‘prospect …’ and of ‘total desirability’. Of
course, total desirabilities shall be calculated in case of decisions under certainty,
and prospect desirabilities in other cases. In the following, however, we can treat
total desirabilities as a limiting case of prospect desirabilities where all probabilities
of the possible consequences are equal to 1.
6. DEFINING ‘PERSONAL DESIRABILITY’
Now, the concept of ‘prospect desirability’ has to be defined. Here only two of the
final definitions can be provided, which, of course, are based on the empirical
hypotheses, in particular H3, and which try to contribute to fulfilling the adequacy
conditions.5
Hypothesis H3 dealt with aggregating desirabilities of an event's
consequences to the prospect desirability of that event in situations without
certainty, in particular when only the consequences' probabilities are known. For
such situations rational decision theory proposes to weigh the consequences'
desirabilities linearly, i.e. with their probability. However, this is not the only
possibility of probability weighting and perhaps not always the best, in particular it
may be not the best e.g. for rare types of decision, when the law of large numbers
does not hold. For such situations decision strategies more risk-averse than linear
probability weighting have been proposed. However, this discussion is beyond the
scope of this paper and hence no theory of rational probability weighting will be
developed here. Therefore, in the following this problem will be left open and only
an undefined weighting function Πx,α 6 – where x is the probability value and α
another situational factor, e.g. frequency of such a decision situation, from which the
probability weight may also depend – will be inserted in the formalism. This does
not entirely prevent the application of the theory presented here because in most
cases the weighting will follow the identity function, so that the weight will be
simply the probability itself.
UPR

Definition of ‘(exact) prospect desirability’:
The ‘prospect desirability of event e for the subject s on the data base
d’ is defined as e's intrinsic desirability (for s) plus the sum of the
intrinsic desirabilities (for s) of all intrinsically non-neutral
consequences of e weighted by their probability weight. – In a
somewhat more formal way this can be reformulated as:
Let ‘Upre,s,d’ be the functional notion ‘the prospect desirability of the
event e for subject s on the data base d’, ‘Uinc,s’ the functional notion
‘the intrinsic desirability of c for the subject s on the data base d’; in

The following definitions rely on and are much more elaborated in: Lumer, 2009, pp. 350-427. An
English exposition of some of its critical ideas is: Lumer, 1998.
5

I use a (mostly) bracket free writing style, where general terms are designated by upper-case letters
and singular terms by lower-case letters which follow the general term. Hence the formula “Πx,α”
used here, in most other texts is written as: “Π(x,α)”.
6
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addition, let {c1, …, cn} be the set of the intrinsically non-neutral
possible consequences of the event e, and p1, …, pn the respective
probabilities on the data base d that the c1, …, cn accompany e.
Then the ‘propect desirability’ is defined as:
Upre,s,d := Uine,s + ∑i Uinci,s ∙ П(pi,α).
If the probabilities (on the data base d) with which the intrinsically nonneutral consequences accompany e are all equal to 1, then we obtain the total
desirability of e for s.
Since, as has been noted above, in most cases it is impossible to list all
intrinsically non-neutral consequences of an event, people summarise the utilities of
the ramifications of some branch of intrinsically non-neutral consequences into the
prospect desirability of the entire branch, where this prospect desirability is only
estimated. The rational foundation of this procedure is the fact that in this way all
the intrinsically non-neutral consequences of e are still considered, they are only
grouped into non-overlapping subsets, namely in each case the intrinsically nonneutral consequences of e which are consequences of the same intermediate
consequence of e.
Hypothesis H2 said that humans use a variety of secondary, in part much
easier but less exact, desirability concepts which rely on an idea of the primary
desirability concept; this is done to be able to adjust decision costs to the respective
situation. The just-developed definition of ‘(exact) prospect desirability’ is a primary
desirability concept. To make the conception applicable in the real world, we still
need secondary desirability criteria, which fulfil the flexibility requirements. My
proposal in this respect is to introduce a kind of flexible “rounding” into the
calculation of prospect desirability. We proceed on the already chosen path, i.e. to
group intrinsically non-neutral consequences via intermediate consequences and
their prospect desirabilities. The next step is to introduce relevance threshold
values such that only intermediate consequences whose prospect desirability
exceeds this threshold are included in the desirability calculation of the main value
object e. Because relevance thresholds can be chosen rather freely this leads to
much flexibility in using the respective concept of ‘rounded prospect desirability’. Of
course, rounded prospect desirability is less precise than exact prospect
desirability; however the gain via accelerating deliberation may still be higher than
the loss via reduced precision. Everyday deliberation uses still another main way to
simplify decision, namely reduction, that is disregarding those consequences which
two options have in common. Of course, this does not change the resulting
preference. I will not elaborate further on this second possibility; reduction is a
question of skill. Rounding and reduction probably cover the great majority of the
rationally justifiable simplifications used in desirability calculation in everyday
deliberation.
On the basis of these considerations the functional notion ‘rounded prospect
desirability’ can easily be defined.

9
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URPR Definition of ‘rounded prospect desirability’:
The ‘rounded prospect desirability of event e for the subject s on the
data base d with the relevance threshold r’ is defined as e's intrinsic
desirability (for s) plus the sum of the (exact) prospect desirabilities
(for s) of all consequences of e which reach the relevance threshold r
weighted by their probability weight. – The somewhat more formal
definition is this:
Let {c1, …, cn} be a set of relevant consequences of the event e (i.e. for
all ci holds: |pi∙ Uprci | ≥ r), and p1, …, pn the respective probabilities on
the data base d that the c1, …, cn accompany e; let ‘Urpre,s,r,d’ be the
functional notion ‘the rounded prospect desirability of the event e for
subject s on the data base d and with a relevance threshold r’ and the
other notions be defined as before. Then the ‘rounded prospect
desirability’ is defined as:
Urpre,s,r,d := Uine,s + ∑i Uprci,s,d ∙ П(pi,α).
The flexibility of this concept can be seen from the fact that in the most
simple deliberations the relevance threshold can be raised so much that of all
considered options (which may be only two: doing a or nothing (a0)) only one
consequence is relevant; on the other extreme the threshold can be lowered and
thereby the precision increased so much that the rounded prospect desirability
captures nearly all intrinsically non-neutral consequences of the value object e and
its value approaches the exact prospect desirability of e.
The final step for concluding the definition of personal value judgments is the
determination of the intrinsic desirability function. Finding the empirical bases and
elaborating the definition and then the rational intrinsic desirability function itself is
a demanding enterprise – just think of the measurement problems – beyond the
scope of this paper.7 However, the result of an extensive discussion of this question
has already been summarised above (end of sect. 4): namely, that only corrected
hedonistic desirability functions can lead to fulfilling all the adequacy conditions for
a practical justificatory thesis. Consequently, the intrinsic desirability presupposed
in the definitions of ‘prospect desirability’ should be taken to be the corrected
hedonistic desirability function.
7. PRACTICAL ARGUMENTS FOR PERSONAL VALUE JUDGMENTS 8
Having defined the necessary desirability concepts we can now establish what
practical arguments are, or more precisely, provide validity and adequacy
conditions for practical arguments for actions and personal desirability judgments.
Above, the thesis for internal practical justifications of actions has been identified
My own proposal for solving this task, including a respective measurement theory, is elaborated in:
Lumer, 2009, pp. 428-548.
7

8

The following criteria are based on more extensive elaboration in: Lumer, 1990, pp. 319-366.
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as: ‘On the data base d (and with a relevance threshold r), action a among the
considered set of options has the highest prospect or total desirability for subject s.’
The direct arguments for such theses are impure molecular arguments (Lumer,
2011, pp. 8-9; 16-19), i.e. arguments composed of several arguments of different
types. At the supreme level there is a deductive argument, which infers from various
premises of the form ‘On the data base d, the prospect desirability of action ai for
subject s is ui’ and one premise that options a1 to an have been considered, that
option a1 has the highest prospect desirability for s (cf. Feldman, 1999, pp. 351-354;
420). This argument is trivial and can be neglected here. The interesting and much
more complex arguments are the subordinated practical arguments in favour of the
various desirability premises (elementary exposition, e.g.: Bowell & Kemp, 2010, pp.
150-153). So these arguments will be dealt with in the following. They make up the
elementary form of practical arguments. Such elementary practical arguments for
personal desirability judgments can then be used in many other forms of molecular
practical arguments like practical justifications of other non-propositional objects
(instruments, proposals, rules etc.), justifications of moral or economic welfare
judgments, arguments for empirical theories etc. (Lumer, 2011, pp. 24-26).
For the epistemological approach to argumentation it is crucial that good
arguments relate to (primary or secondary) truth criteria for the respective claim.
More precisely, the way good arguments function is that they string judgments (the
argument's reasons) in which some sufficient truth conditions for the thesis are
judged to be fulfilled. When the addressee follows the listing of these judgments he
then can assess step by step whether, according to his knowledge, all truth
conditions for the thesis are fulfilled. The primary truth criteria for personal
desirability judgments are, of course, the respective ‘desirability’ definitions, hence,
in our theory, the desirability definitions of the last section.
Following these lines and the paradigms of epistemological definitions of
other kinds of arguments (Lumer, 1990; some synthesis: Lumer, 2005c) ‘valid
practical argument’ can be defined as follows (cf. Lumer, 1990, pp. 319-366) – here
‘argumentative validity’ comprises what is usually separated as ‘validity’ and
‘soundness’; argumentative validity implies the truth or acceptability of the thesis.
The definition covers only the (simple) case of the linear weighting function, so that
probability values can immediately be used as the respective weights.
PA

Definition of ‘ideal valid (differentiating) practical argument’ (for
personal desirability judgments):
x is an ideal valid (differentiating) practical argument iff

PA0

Domain of definition: x is a triple r°,i,t, consisting of
1. a set r° of judgments r1, r2, ..., rm,
2. an indicator i of argument, and
3. a judgement t;
r1, ..., rm (the elements of r°) are called the ‘reasons for t’ and t is called
‘the thesis of x’.

11
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PA1

Form of the ideal (differentiating) practical argument:
1. Form of the thesis: The thesis t has (in the most ideal case) the form:
‘On the data base d the (rounded prospect) desirability of event e for
subject s with the relevance threshold r is u.’ (This is the most
complicated form of the thesis; simpler forms of such a thesis and
hence formally simpler arguments can be obtained by omitting the
reference to a relevance threshold, i.e. by providing an argument for
the exact prospect desirability of e, or, when all non-neutral
consequences of e are known with certainty, by arguing for a total
desirability value (instead of prospect desirability) of e.)
2. Forms of the reasons:
2.1. There are n judgments of the form: ‘On the data base d the
probability that the consequence ci accompanies (in particular: is
caused or symbolically or legally implied by) e is pi.’, with 0<pi≤1.
2.2. For all judgments of the first form there is an associated judgment
of the form: ‘On the data base d the (exact) prospect or total
desirability of the consequence ci for the subject s is ui.’
2.3. There is one judgment of the form: ‘On the data base d, the
consequences c1, …, cn are all the r-relevant consequences of e.’ (As
has been explained in RPC5, this means roughly that for all these
consequences ci (the absolute value of) the product of their
probability pi and their exact prospect desirability ui (for s) reaches
the relevance threshold r (|pi∙ui| ≥ r); and there are no further
consequences of e reaching the relevance threshold r.
2.4. A further judgment states: ‘The intrinsic desirability of e for s is
ue.’
2.5. Finally, there is one judgment stating: ‘The sum of (e's intrinsic
desirability) ue and of all the products of the relevant consequences' ci
desirabilities ui and their respective probabilities pi is equal to u (ue +
∑i ui∙pi = u).’
2.6. Data base: All reasons mentioning a data base refer to the same
data base d.
3. Indicator of argument: i indicates that x is an argument, that r1, r2, ...,
rm are the reasons and that t is the thesis of x; in addition i can indicate
the type of argument, i.e. that x is a practical (differentiating)
argument.

PA2

Argumentative validity: 1. guarantee of truth:
1. All reasons ri of the argument are true.
2. No consequence ci (see PA1.2.1) or its non-neutral consequences
overlap (i.e. is identical with, part of or partially part of) with any
other cj from c1, …, cn or its non-neutral consequences. And

PA3

Argumentative validity: 2. Adequacy in principle: There is a person sx
for whom d is the set of relevant data which can influence the
evaluation of e.
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General definition of (possibly not ideal) ‘valid practical argument’ (for
personal desirability judgments):
PA4

Liberalisation: y is a valid (differentiating) practical argument iff:
0. Domain of definition: y is a triple q°,i,t', consisting of
0.1. a set q° of judgments q1, q2, ..., qk,
0.2. an indicator i of argument, and
0.3. a judgment t';
1. Ideal version of y: There is an x (an ideal version of y) for which
holds:
1.1. x is an ideal valid differentiating practical argument with the
specifications given in PA0-PA3.
1.2. t' is identical to or a simplified form of t, specifying at least: ‘The
desirability of e for subject s is u.’
1.3. The reasons q° of y are a subset of (perhaps somewhat simplified
versions of) the reasons r° of x which contains at least the reasons
listing the consequences of e (reasons PA1.2.1) and, if e is not
intrinsically neutral, the intrinsic valuation of e itself (reason PA1.2.3).
And
2. Indicator of argument: i indicates that y is an argument, that q1, q2,
..., qk are the reasons and that t' is the thesis of y; in addition i can
indicate the type of argument.

PA5

Situational adequacy: A valid (differentiating) practical argument with
the characteristics just explained is adequate for rationally convincing
an addressee h (hearer) of the thesis t (or t') iff:
1. Rationality of the addressee: The addressee h is linguistically
competent, open-minded, attentive, discriminating.
2. Convincibility: The addressee h does not yet have a (valid)
justification for the thesis t (or t' respectively), or he has only a
justification that is weaker than the one presented in the argument.
3. Data base: dh, i.e. the addressee's data base, in its parts relevant for
the argument, is identical to data base d underlying the argument or it
is a subset of d. In the latter case and if the addressee's data base dh
contains data incompatible with the argument's data base d, before an
adequate use of the argument, the arguer and the addressee first have
to exchange information and perhaps other arguments as well to
equalise the data bases d and dh.
4. Knowledge about the consequences: The addressee h already
justifiedly believes in the consequence listing reasons (reasons of type
PA1.2.1) or he is able to recognise their acceptability immediately.
(There is no prior knowledge requirement with respect to the
completeness statement (PA1.2.3) because its truth, given the huge
data bases we usually have available, cannot be positively recognised
at all. We can only negatively find out perhaps that this statement is
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not true. And there is no prior knowledge requirement regarding the
calculation (PA1.2.5) because its truth can be recognised in actu.)
5. Knowledge about the valuations: The addressee h already believes in
the desirability judgments about the consequences and about the
value object e itself (PA1.2.2, PA1.2.4) or he is able to recognise these
desirabilities in actu. (If this condition is not fulfilled a subordinate
practical argument can be opened for fulfilling it.)
6. Relevance level: The relevance level r chosen in the argument is not
more coarsely-grained than the level rationally desired by the
addressee.
7. Practical function: In order to have a practical function, i.e. to make
the addressee not only rationally believe in the thesis t but also make
him adopt the valuation expressed in it as his own, the value subject s
(referred to in the thesis t) has to be identical to addressee h or has to
have – in the relevant respects – the same value function as addressee
h.
It may be helpful to highlight some elements of this definition. Conditions
PA1-PA3 define ‘ideal valid practical arguments’ condition; PA4 releases these ideal
conditions mainly by permitting to leave out various premises in an enthymematic
fashion. Conditions PA1.2.1-2 require that there are pairs of reasons which in each
case list some consequence of the value object and then assesses its prospect
desirability. Condition PA1.2.5 instead speaks of the summarising statement in
which all the consequences’ desirabilities and probabilities are aggregated to one
overall desirability value. PA2.1 requires all the reasons of the argument to be true.
An example for such an (ideal) practical argument is: ‘To cycle to the office is
good physical exercise for me, it is eco-friendly, nearly as fast as going by car, and
the probability of being caught in a rain today is marginal / 1%. According to my
present information, these are all the relevant consequences of cycling to the office.
These consequences, according to my preferences, are very good, good, satisfactory
and marginally bad respectively which can be rated as 4 + 2 + 1 + (-2 · 0.01),
which sums up to a relatively very, very high utility of 6.98. Therefore, cycling to
the office according to my present information is very, very good for me has a
rating of 6.98.’ Since the first three consequences, unlike the fourth, are certain
there is no need to weight them by their probability.
The adequacy condition PA5 is something like an instruction for use, or more
precisely for the standard function of such arguments, namely convincing an
addressee of the thesis – though definitely there are also other specific uses of
arguments, e.g. systemising one's own deliberation or explaining one's motives to
others. Practical arguments, unlike e.g. deductive arguments, do not leave much
room for proving the thesis in different ways. The only real margin in this respect is
to change the relevance threshold. If arguer and addressee have different data bases
they have to arrange for making them identical in the relevant parts; if the
addressee does not yet believe in some consequence statement or if he cannot
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recognise the desirability of some consequence he first has to be convinced of it by a
further argument.
Differentiating practical arguments use the definition of ‘rounded prospect
desirability’ and justify the value object's prospect desirability by reducing it to the
prospect desirabilities of its consequences. Founding practical arguments go beyond
this level and, based on the definition of ‘(exact) prospect desirability’, justify the
value object's prospect desirability by reducing it to the intrinsic desirabilities of its
consequences. Their structure is similar to the differentiating practical arguments;
the main difference is that the consequences have to be valued intrinsically (cf.
PA1.2.2).
8. CONCLUSION
With the definition of ‘valid practical argument’ and by providing conditions for
their adequate use for rationally convincing, the development of good criteria for
practical arguments has come to an end. Because of their psychological foundation,
the so-defined arguments, or more precisely, the arguments for optimality
judgments of which they are a part, fulfil the adequacy conditions for practical
justifications of actions. Expressed somewhat differently: With this definition a
valuable instrument has been designed for fulfilling several functions
simultaneously. On the one hand, these arguments can be used to rationally
convince the addressee of the thesis, which by the epistemological approach to
argumentation is generally required of good arguments; on the other hand, belief in
an optimality judgment about a future action, according to the sketched decision
psychology, stably motivates a prudent agent to execute that action.
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